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COMMENTS 
PRIVATE INSURANCE AS A SOLUTION 
TO THE DRIVER-GUEST DILEMMA 
The duty of the driver of an automobile to his nonpaying passenger, and 
liability arising from the breach of that duty, has long presented a trouble-
some area of litigation for the courts and the parties involved. Application 
of standards unsuited for the peculiar risks of automotive transportation has 
produced inadequate compensation in some cases and excessive recoveries 
in others. Meanwhile, trial calendars are overcrowded with personal injury 
litigation, and insurance companies must bear the awards of sympathetic 
juries and those resulting from collusion between passenger and driver. The 
over-all expense of this method of determination of liability, far too little of 
which actually goes to compensate the injured plaintiff, is passed on to the 
public in the form of higher insurance premiums. It is the purpose of this 
comment to review the approaches heretofore used in defining the driver's 
duty, and to offer a solution which, by eliminating the inherent difficulties 
in these approaches, might afford a fairer and more workable means of com-
pensating the injured guest. 
I. THE NATURE OF THE EXISTING PROBLEM 
Four different approaches have been used in defining the driver's duty 
to a nonpaying passenger. Some courts have employed an analogy to the 
gratuitous bailment of chattels, and have held the driver to the bailee's duty 
of refraining from "gross negligence."1 Analogy to the duties of an owner of 
real estate has also been applied,2 principally involving the distinction be-
tween a person who is invited by the owner to enter his premises, and one 
whose request to enter is granted by the owner. Applying this distinction to 
the invited passenger and one who has requested a ride, the courts have 
allowed the former to recover for the- driver's ordinary negligence, while the 
latter is treated as a mere licensee or trespasser and must prove wanton or 
willful conduct by the driver in order to recover.3 Pursuing this analogy to 
the landowner's duties, a standard of ordinary negligence is applied to affirm-
ative acts of the driver,4 and he must inform the guest of any defects in the 
1 E.g., Slaton v. Hall, 172 Ga. 675, 158 S.E. 747 (1931); Passler v. Mowbray, 318 Mass. 
231, 61 N.E.2d 120 (1945); Rose v. Squires, 101 N.J.L. 438, 128 Atl. 438 (1925); see PROSSER, 
TORTS § 77 (2d ed. 1955). 
2 See, e.g., Cohen v. Kaminetsky, 36 N.J. 276, 176 A.2d 483 (1961); MacKenzie v. Oakley, 
94 N.J.L. 66, 108 Atl. 771 (1920); Lutvin v. Dopkus, 94 N.J.L. 64, 108 Atl. 862 (1920). 
a Lutvin v. Dopkus, supra note 2; Kraus v. Fisher, 9 N.J. Misc. 1053, 156 Atl. 315 
(Sup. Ct. 1931); Gruda v. Karbowski, 6 N.J. Misc. 49, 139 Atl. 893 (Sup. Ct. 1928). New 
Jersey appears to be the only state to have made this distinction. It finally decided to 
switch to an ordinary care approach in Cohen v. Kaminetsky, supra note 2. 
4 Central Copper Co. v. Klefisch, 34 Ariz. 230, 270 Pac. 629 (1928); Dickerson v. Con-
necticut Co., 98 Conn. 87, 118 Atl. 518 (1922); Lorance v. Smith, 173 La. 883, 138 So. 871 
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automobile of which he is aware.is However, unknown defects in the auto-
mobile, 6 as well as incompetence7 or active misconduct8 of the driver which 
are known or obvious to him, are risks which the guest must assume. A third 
approach has been the establishment of a general standard of ordinary 
negligence in all driver-guest situations, disregarding the nice distinctions 
of bailment and real estate doctrines.9 In a majority of cases decided under 
the foregoing common-law principles the injured guests were successful.10 
More often than not, active negligence on the driver's part was found, 
rather than a concealed defect which might have vindicated the driver under 
the owner-of-real-estate analogy. The fourth approach is embodied in the 
so-called "guest statutes," now in force in about half the states. Such statutes 
distinguish between the paying and nonpaying passenger, imposing liability 
for ordinary negligence in the former case, yet only for intentional, "willful," 
or "wanton" conduct-essentially a gross negligence standard-in the latter 
case.11 
All of the foregoing attempts to define the driver's duty have inherent 
deficiencies. The rationale of the gratuitous bailment cases is objectionable 
in that the law should have a higher regard for the safety of human life 
than it does for the safety of property in gratuitous undertakings.12 Certainly 
the slight duty of care owed by a gratuitous bailee of chattels is an entirely 
inadequate safeguard where human life is concerned. Moreover, the standard 
of "gross negligence" upon which liability is determined is difficult to define 
and administer.18 Although the rule was designed for the situation where 
(1932); Dashiell v. Moore, 177 Md. 657, 11 A.2d 640 (1940); Rudolph v. Ketter, 233 Wis. 
329, 289 N.W. 674 (1940). 
5 In re O'Byme's Estate, 133 Neb. 750, 277 N.W. 74 (1938); Waters v. Markham, 204 
Wis. 332, 2!15 N.W. 797 (1931); cf. Eastman v. Silva, 156 Wash. 613, 287 Pac. 656 (1930). 
6 See, e.g., Sloan v. Gulf Ref. Co., 139 So. 26 (La. App. 1924) (lights); Clise v. Prunty, 
108 W. Va. 635, 152 S.E. 201 (1930) (chains and brakes); Harding v. Jesse, 189 Wis. 652, 
207 N.W. 706 (1926) (brakes). See also Higgins v. Mason, 255 N.Y. 104, 174 N.E. 77 
(1930); Marple v. Haddad, 103 W. Va. 508, 138 S.E. 113 (1927); Jensen v. Jensen, 228 Wis. 
77, 279 N.W. 628 (1938). 
7 See, e.g., Powell v. Berry, 145 Ga. 696, 89 S.E. 753 (1916) (intoxication); Krueger v. 
Krueger, 197 Wis. 588, 222 N.W. 784 (1929) (sleepiness); Clearly v. Eckart, 191 Wis. 114, 
210 N.W. 267 (1926) (inexperience). 
8 See, e.g., Curry v. Riggles, 302 Pa. 156, 153 Atl. 325 (1931) (improper driving); Leonard 
v. Bartle, 48 R.I. 101, 135 Atl. 853 (1927) (overcrowding); Brockhaus v. Neuman, 201 Wis. 
57, 228 N.W. 477 (1930) (speed). 
o See, e.g., Sheean v. Foster, 80 Cal. App. 56, 251 Pac. 235 (1926); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 
141 La. 271, 74 So. 992 (1917); HUDDY, AUTOMOBILES 118 (2d ed. 1909). 
10 See Cohen v. Kaminetsky, 36 N.J. 276, 176 A.2d 483 (1961). 
11 The statutes are collected and classified in Comment, 3 WYO. L.J. 225 (1949); Com-
ment, 1 Wvo. L.J. 182 (1947). 
12 See Munson v. Rupker, 148 N.E. 169, 174 (Ind. App. 1925). This case presented a 
rather complete review of the approaches used in defining the driver's duty to his guest. 
It criticized all the approaches except that of reasonable care, stating that the latter 
is the only sensible rule. See also 18 VA. L. R.Ev. 342 (1932). 
13 See Steamboat New World v. King, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 469, 473 (1853). This case 
discussed the attempts to fix degrees of negligence, and pointed out the disapprobation 
of the judiciary for such attempts because of the impracticability of applying degrees of 
negligence to specific fact situations. 
508 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
the relationship of driver and passenger exists only for the benefit of the 
passenger, the courts apply the standard indiscriminately to all nonpaying 
passengers, even though not all nonpaying passengers have the same status. 
In many cases the relationship may be for the mutual benefit of the parties,u 
or even for the sole benefit of the driver.15 There is no reason to apply a 
lower standard of care in such cases just because the driver received no 
financial reward. 
Much of the same criticism can be directed at the licensee-invitee analogy. 
There is an inherent difficulty in deciding whether a passenger is a licensee 
or invitee according to the niceties and subtleties of such definitions.16 Also, 
the risks of a guest upon real property bear little resemblance to those faced 
by the gratuitous passenger in an automobile. Land is an inactive thing, and 
a licensee going onto real estate may assume that the owner will not put in 
force motion that may injure him. But the driver of a car does create a 
danger by putting a force in motion, and because of the sacredness of life 
and limb, the law should demand that he control it with care proportionate 
to the danger created. The standard of ordinary care involved in the third 
approach has also been criticized. In many instances it seems unjust to allow 
an ungrateful passenger, having accepted a free ride, to impose liability upon 
the driver as a result of an ordinary traffic mishap.17 A more serious problem 
is that of collusion. The increased use of liability insurance by drivers, made 
necessary by the growing frequency and severity of automobile accidents, 
has tended to lessen the reluctance of injured passengers to sue their drivers. 
The real defendant in driver-guest litigation is generally an insurance com-
pany, and ordinary negligence is not hard to prove if the passenger and the 
driver cooperate to that end. Since in many cases gratuitous passengers are 
relatives or friends, the personal injury actions have become a source of 
collusion and fraud against the insurance company.18 Not only are the 
insurance companies hurt by the collusive verdicts obtained by the injured 
passenger, but so is the driving public, since every adverse verdict tends to 
increase the premiums paid by automobile drivers. 
The enactment in many states of automobile guest statutes, which make 
proof of willful or wanton conduct by the driver necessary for recovery by a 
guest, has been to a large extent responsive to the problem of collusion. Al-
though the guest statutes cure the difficulties of the ordinary care approach-
ingratitude and collusive litigation-it is questionable whether these advan-
14 See, e.g., O'Brien v. Woldson, 149 Wash. 192, 270 Pac. 304 (1928). 
15 See, e.g., Gaboury v. Tisdell, 261 Mass. 147, 158 N.E. 348 (1927); Lyttle v. Monto, 
248 Mass. 340, 142 N.E. 795 (1924); Flynn v. Lewis, 231 Mass. 550, 121 N.E. 493 (1919); 
Rook v. Schultz, 100 Ore. 482, 198 Pac. 234 (1921). 
16 See, e.g., Cohen v. Kaminetsky, 36 N.J. 276, 176 A.2d 483 (1961). 
17 See, e.g., Galloway v. Perkins, 198 Ala. 658, 73 So. 956, 957 (1917); Mitchell v. 
Raymond, 181 Wis. 591, 195 N.W. 855, 868 (1923). 
18 See Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931). The court pointed out 
that the fear of collusion constituted a reasonable basis for legislative classification, and 
that therefore plaintiff's objection that the statute violated the equal protection clause 
of the fourteenth amendment was without merit. 
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tages compenste for the host of problems such legislation presents. Perhaps 
the major problem is one of definition. Disagreement has marked judicial 
attempts to define "willful and wanton," even within the same jurisdiction.19 
Definitional problems are also involved with "guest"; apparently the same 
indiscriminate standard is applied to all nonpaying passengers20 regardless 
of non-monetary benefits conferred on the driver. This factor has led some 
writers to advocate a stricter definition of "guest."21 
Just as in the cases of the first two approaches above, it can be argued 
that the slight duty of care required of the driver by the statutes is an inade-
quate safeguard where human life and safety are at stake. The charge of 
perjury and collusion between the driver and passenger should furnish no 
sound reason for altering the substantive duty of the driver. Nor should 
fear of rising insurance rates provide cause for limiting the driver's duty 
beyond a degree consistent with the dangers of automobile transportation. 
And it may be of socio-economic benefit for the loss to injured passengers to 
be shared by the car-owning public rather than be borne by the injured 
alone. 
II. A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The problems apparent in the four approaches described would best be 
remedied by removal of the most troublesome issue-fault. Through use of 
the insurance plan which will be discussed, drivers as well as guests could 
be spared the trouble and expense of litigation, and yet the injured party 
would receive reasonable compensation. Rather than attempt a compulsory 
insurance program, however, the injured guest would retain the alternative 
of suing under the ordinary care approach where the driver has chosen not 
to carry guest insurance. Upon this framework, the following legislative 
scheme is proposed: 
(1) The injured passenger will have his common-law, ordinary care 
remedy22 if the driver does not utilize private insurance to provide compen-
sation for the passenger's injuries. 
(2) If, however, the driver carries a liability policy with a "passenger pro-
tection rider," the injured passenger's sole remedy is a direct action against 
the insurer to recover the amount prescribed under such rider. 
10 See Cope v. Davison, 30 Cal. 2d 193, 180 P.2d 873 (1947). In California, broad inter-
pretation of "gross negligence" has caused the virtual elimination of this concept from 
legislation. See CAL. VEHICLE ConE § 17158. 
20 For example, since the statutes do not expressly exclude infants from coverage, it is 
conceivable that the undesirable result of an infant being considered a "guest" and 
allowed to recover only for willful and wanton conduct could occur. 
21 2 HARP.ER & JAMES, TORTS § 16.15 (1956). 
22 From the foregoing criticisms of the guest statutes, it may be forcibly argued that, 
aside from the problems of collusion and excessive litigation, the ordinary care approach 
is a sound and salutary way to define the driver's duty. Even the problem of collusion 
may have been somewhat mitigated by the current practice of preferred premium rates 
for safe drivers-those who have not been involved in accidents for a certain length of time. 
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(3) The sum to be recovered by the passenger will be reasonable medical 
expenses in minimum amounts set by statute. 
(4) The injured passenger can recover from the insurer without regard 
to the question of fault of the parties, so long as he is covered under the 
passenger protection rider. 
(5) The legislative scheme is not compulsory, although it contains a 
great inducement to the automobile driver to purchase the policy, so that 
he may avoid the risk of excessive personal .liability which might result from 
a case litigated under the ordinary care standard. 
(6) The insurance is private and therefore unencumbered by adminis-
trative assessment and state control. 
The main emphasis of the legislative scheme, therefore, is to allow pri-
vate insurance to solve the problem by contract, thus freeing the courts from 
the burden of interpreting such vague terms as "willful," "wanton," "gross 
negligence," and other phraseology which has traditionally been employed 
in a vain attempt to define fairly the driver's duty to his passenger. The pay-
ment of reasonable medical expenses under the passenger protection rider 
merely extends the "first aid" clause now written into automobile liability 
insurance. These features will solve most of the problems of the driver-guest 
situation by providing a reasonable measure of compensation to an injured 
victim, while reducing tort litigation and its attendant evils. Today personal 
injury actions constitute a great portion of all lawsuits, with the result of 
serious impairment of the effectiveness of the law because of the clogging of 
court dockets.23 This delay frequently results in a distortion of the facts, 
since witnesses are forced to reconstruct events which occurred years earlier.2' 
The proposed legislation, by reducing the quantity of litigation, would 
increase confidence in the legal process. Even if the injured party, after the 
delay and expense of a number of years of litigation, wins the suit and is 
awarded a judgment, he has only a slim chance to realize his award if the 
defendant does not carry automobile insurance.25 This uncertainty, expense, 
and delay which now deter many victims from prosecuting just claims would 
be eliminated by the legislation. Since the suggested scheme of insurance is 
a voluntary, private plan,26 unencumbered by administrative assessment and 
2s Life, Nov. 10, 1952, p. 127. 
24 Marx, Let's Compensate-Nat Litigate, 3 FEDERATION OF INSURANCE COUNSEL Q. 62 
(1953). 
25 A computation by the New York Insurance Department in 1950 disclosed that in 
New York alone the ascertained uninsured bodily injury was well over $10,000,000. N.Y. 
STATE INS. DEP'T REP., THE PROBLEM OF THE UNINSURED MOTORIST 11, 12 (1951), If the 
defendant does not carry liability insurance, the injured has only a 25% chance to obtain 
compensation. See REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE To STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE 
AccmENTS 86 (Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences 1932). 
26 When Massachusetts in 1925 introduced a system of compulsory liability insurance, 
many critics stated that political complications and increased state regulation of private 
insurance are necessary or at least probable concomitants of compulsory insurance. See, 
e.g., McVay, The Case Against Compulsory Automobile Compensation Insurance, 15 Omo 
ST. L.J. 150 (1954). 
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state control,27 it differs significantly from plans based on the workmen's 
compensation rationale, which have been rejected in some states. 
This legislation, which could remedy to a large extent the problems of 
driver liability without resort to objectionable compulsory insurance plans, 
might be drafted as follows: 
"Sec. I. In any action by a passenger (as defined in section l(a) infra) 
or, in case of death of such passenger, by his dependents against the 
owner or operator of a motor vehicle for unintentional injury to person 
or property while a passenger in such motor vehicle, the owner or opera-
tor shall be held to a duty of ordinary care; and damages, if any, shall be 
measured according to common-law negligence principles, except that 
if the owner or operator has an automobile liability insurance contract 
with a valid passenger protection rider (as defined in section l(b) infra), 
the passenger's sole and exclusive remedy shall be a direct action against 
the insurer for the amount prescribed under such rider. If, however, 
this direct action eventuates in a finding that the passenger is not covered 
by the passenger protection rider, the passenger may then pursue a com-
mon-law action against the owner or operator. 
"(a) For purposes of this-statute, a passenger shall include all indi-
viduals riding in a motor vehicle with the knowledge or consent of the 
owner or operator, except: 
I. The operator of such motor vehicle, 
2. Those individuals riding in a common carrier, 
3. Those individuals who have an express contract of transporta-
tion with the operator, employer of the operator, or owner of the 
motor vehicle, and 
4. Employees of the owner or operator, if covered by a workmen's 
compensation statute. 
"(b) A passenger protection rider is a provision in a contract of 
liability insurance for payment to a passenger as defined above without 
reference to the fault of the driver of all reasonable medical expenses in 
minimum amounts set by statute up to a maximum of $.-----
and disability allowances according to the following schedule .... 
"Sec. 2. The statute of limitations for the common-law action shall be 
tolled during the period the direct action against the insurer is pending. 
"Sec. 3. If a passenger (or his dependents), entitled to compensation 
under th~ passenger protection rider, is injured or killed by the sole 
negligence or wrong of another, not the owner or operator of the vehicle 
in which the passenger was injured, or by the joint negligence or wrong 
of such other and the owner or operator of the vehicle in which the 
passenger was injured, such injured passenger (or his dependents) need 
not elect whether to take compensation under the rider or to pursue a 
common-law remedy against such other, but may take such compensation 
and at any time prior thereto or within six months after the awarding 
of compensation pursue his remedy against such other. If such injured 
27 Since minimum coverages will be prescribed by statute, only a minimum amount 
of state control of underwriting practices would be necessary. 
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passenger (or his dependents) takes or intends to take compensation 
under the passenger protection rider and desires to bring action against 
such other, such action must be commenced not later than six months 
after the awarding of compensation and in any event before the expira-
tion of one year from the date such action accrues. In such case the 
insurer liable for the payment of such compensation shall have a lien 
on the proceeds of any recovery from such other, whether by judgment, 
settlement or otherwise, after the deduction of the reasonable and neces-
sary expenditures, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred in effect-
ing such recovery, to the extent of the total amount awarded under the 
passenger protection rider. 
"Sec. 4. If such injured passenger (or his dependents) has taken com-
pensation under the passenger protection rider, but has failed to com-
mence action against such other within the time limited therefor, such 
failure shall operate as an assignment of the cause of action against such 
other to the insurer. If the insurer recovers from such other, either by 
judgment, settlement, or otherwise, a sum in excess of the total amount 
of compensation awarded to such injured passenger (or his dependents) 
together with the reasonable and necessary expenditures incurred in 
effecting such recovery, it shall forthwith pay to such injured passenger 
(or his dependents) any such excess. 
"Sec. 5. If such injured passenger (or his dependents) proceed against 
such other, the insurer shall contribute only the deficiency, if any, be-
tween the amount of the recovery against such other person actually 
collected, and the compensation provided for by the passenger protec-
tion rider." 
Discussion of the proposed legislation involves two important inquiries. 
First, does the legislation solve the problems inherent in the approaches here-
tofore used? Second, does the legislation itself present problems such as 
workability or constitutionality? 
The problems of the analogy approaches stem principally from the 
difficulty of definition of such concepts as "gross negligence," "licensee" and 
"invitee" and the dissimilarity between the factual settings of these analogues 
and the driver-guest situation. This leads to the application of an inadequate 
standard of care in the situation in which human life is jeopardized by the 
dangerous force of the automobile. The suggested legislation 'contains no 
definitional pitfalls. The provisions of the policy will attach if a "passenger," 
as explicitly and comprehensively defined in the statute, is injured uninten-
tionally. In response to another criticism of the analogies-that the standard 
of care is so slight that human life is not satisfactorily safeguarded-the legis-
lation should result in economically induced carefulness on the part of the 
driver. If the insurer must pay under the policy even in the case of faultless-
ness on the part of the driver, and if passenger protection premiums will be 
dependent upon the risk experience of the insured drivers, the probability 
of increased premiums will induce the driver to be especially careful to 
avoid any accident. 
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A major problem involved in the ordinary care approach-collusion-
would be greatly reduced, because the statutory limitation upon the amount 
of recovery would virtually remove the incentive, and the elimination of the 
fault issue would largely eliminate the occasion for the collusion. It may be 
contended, however, that the danger of collusion would not be eliminated, 
since a driver is not compelled to buy a passenger protection rider, and he 
could simply rely upon ordinary automobile liability insurance to shift the 
burden of his common-law liability to an insurance company. Such a choice 
by the driver would produce the very situation found in jurisdictions which 
espouse the ordinary care approach. This continuance of the problem could 
be avoided if insurance companies either refuse to write automobile in-
surance contracts without the passenger protection rider, or charge such 
high premiums on policies lacking the rider that drivers economically are 
forced to purchase the rider. It might also be argued that, as juries become 
familiar with the passenger protection rider and realize that driver-guest 
litigation over common-law negligence arises only where the driver has 
failed to purchase this protection, they will become more liberal than ever 
in awarding verdicts to injured passengers. This might cause insurance 
coverage without the rider to become even more costly. 
A further problem involved in the ordinary care approach-court clog-
ging-would also be greatly reduced by the statutory scheme. Although the 
passenger's sole remedy, assuming the driver has a protection rider, does 
involve a court action against the insurer, the only disputable issues to be 
determined will be coverage, injury, causation, and amount of damages. The 
most troublesome issue-negligence-will, of course, not be litigated. And of 
the four disputable issues left in such cases, only the amount of damages 
would be hotly contested in the average action. 
Although the courts would be only minimally involved in such a scheme, 
and there would thus be substantial conservation of judicial energy, some 
may still advocate abandonment of jury trial in guest cases, with determina-
tion to be entrusted to administrative boards.28 The administrative tribunal, 
it is argued, would be much less expensive and time-consuming than jury 
trial. However, in an excellent study, accompanied by statistical data, com-
paring the relative expense of federal employers' liability and workmen's 
compensation, it was ascertained that the employers' liability system, in-
volving jury trials, insofar as disputable issues are concerned, costs less per 
dollar of benefits obtained.29 The added expense of administrative deter-
mination, both in the establishment and operation of such a board, indicates 
that direct court action against the insurer is the more feasible approach.80 
28 See, e.g., Pillsbury. Administrative Tribunals, 36 HARV. L. REv. 405, 423 (1922). But 
see DAVIS, ADlllINISTRATIVE LAW 16 (1951). 
20 See Conard, Workmen's Compensation: Is it More Efficient Than Employer's 
Liability? 38 A.B.A.J. IOU, 1058 (1952). 
so Administrative determination of guest cases would not, of course, be objectionable 
if a state decided to handle all personal injury suits in the setting of an administrative 
board. 
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The guest statute's deficiency of inadequate safeguard of human life, 
because of the slight duty of care required, as well as the serious problems 
of definition involved, would. be eliminated by the proposed private in-
surance scheme. The proposed legislation allows the problem of excessive 
recoveries occasioned by jury sympathy or collusion to be solved by the pri-
vate insurer through contract, rather than by a court which is forced to make 
tenuous distinctions in interpreting language of conduct, such as "willful" 
and "wanton." 
III. PROBLEMS UNDER THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
Assuming that the proposed legislation obviates the major problems 
inherent in the existing approaches to driver-guest litigation, it might be 
asked whether it will introduce its own peculiar problems, not present in 
the existing schemes. It is conceivable, for instance, that constitutional 
arguments might be raised against the proposed legislation. Although the 
plan is literally voluntary, the potentially high cost of driving without the 
passenger protection rider will virtually compel all drivers to adhere to the 
legislative scheme. However, a state's power to establish and regulate its 
highways would appear to justify enactment of such a protective measure. 
Support for this proposition is found in the Supreme Court's refusal to strike 
down the Massachusetts compulsory insurance scheme involved in Ex parte 
Poresky.81 It might also be argued that the elimination of the common-law 
negligence action of the passenger against an owner or operator having an 
insurance policy with a passenger protection rider is unconstitutional in that 
it takes his property without due process of law. However, the workmen's 
compensation laws, as well as the guest statutes themselves,82 have been 
found constitutional, and therefore this argument would appear to be met. 
More debatable is the problem of discrimination, as passengers of drivers 
who have no contract of insurance with a passenger protection rider will be 
treated differently from those whose drivers carry such insurance, and the 
passenger, although he is the party most affected by such classification, will 
have no prior control over his mode of treatment. It appears, however, that, 
even if this objection is pressed, the courts should have no difficulty in up-
holding the reasonableness of the classification.38 
Another extremely important consideration is whether the suggested 
insurance scheme will sell. Naturally, this will depend to a great extent upon 
how the legislation will affect insurance rates, i.e., to what extent will the 
cost of insurance increase? A significant factor which deserves repeated 
81 290 U.S. l!0 (19lll!). A Massachusetts resident claimed he could not afford to comply 
with the statute, yet wished to drive a car on the state's highways. The district court 
dismissed for lack of a federal question, and the Supreme Court affirmed in a brief per 
curiam decision. 
82 See Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929). 
88 The Supreme Court has indicated a readiness to sustain legislative classifications 
not based on race or alienage. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., ll48 U.S. 48l! (1955). 
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emphasis is that the driver would be under a great inducement to buy such a 
policy, if the rates are at all reasonable. The likelihood of an automobile 
accident occurring today is greater than ever, and juries in negligence suits 
have shown increased willingness to award liberal compensation to injured 
claimants. An insurer, recognizing the danger of collusion, will either not 
allow the loss to be shifted to it, or in doing so will charge a sufficient pre-
mium to absorb such losses. With regard to the impact of the legislation on 
the fixing by the insurer of reasonable premium rates, the limit on the total 
amount of recovery should provide a working basis for actuarial rates. Al-
though only a thorough actuarial analysis could lead to a final conclusion, a 
number of factors reducing costs of the insurer indicate fairly low rates 
could be charged, probably even lower than a liability insurance contract 
without the passenger protection rider. First, the reduction in litigation wiU 
substantially reduce the insurer's costs of defending or settling such actions, 
an expense which previously would haye been passed on to policy holders 
in the form of higher premjums. Second, the limitations on recovery under 
this legislation could very well result in an over-all decrease in the insurer's 
outlay for accident claims. Although more claims would be presented, they 
would not be padded by a sympathetic jury's inclination to award excessive 
damages, often taking into consideration the high percentage of the award 
which will be paid the plaintiff's lawyer, who usually is operating on a 
contingent fee basis. Thus it is possible that an insurer will issue a policy 
with a passenger protection rider at a rate lower than a liability insurance 
policy without such a rider. This, of course, will depend upon the extent 
to which liability without reference to fault will increase the number of 
compensable claims. These factors have induced one company, Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Company, to offer a so-called family compensation en-
dorsement.H The endorsement, created in 1957, has obtained approval in 
a number of states.85 The main thrust of the scheme is an absolute liability 
option, whereby an insured may, for an extra premium comparable to that for 
the medical payments protection,86 add this family compensation endorse-
ment to his liability policy. If he is involved in an accident with his car, the 
injured party has a choice of pursuing his claim under ordinary negligence 
law or of accepting immediate payment under the option without regard 
to whether the insured was at fault or would be liable at law. Payment is 
made according to a schedule, but covers death benefits, indemnity, and 
medical expense. 87 
H See, Averbach, A NACCA Lawyer's Views on the Casualty Insurance Industry, 1958 
INS, L.J. 27, 32-33. 
85 As of 1958, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Rhode Island, Vermont, Indiana, 
Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and South Carolina had approved the endorse-
ment. Ibid. 
86 The insured has an option of obtaining the endorsement along with the company's 
auto liability policy; the endorsement costs slightly more than the present medical payment 
part of the standard policy. 
87 According to casualty actuary Robert Griffith, the endorsement will go a long way 
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The giving of an option to the injured party to accept immediate pay-
ment under the endorsement indicates a strong desire on the part of the 
insurance company to. increase the settlement of claims without litigation. 
This apparent distaste of insurance companies for extensive litigation under 
common-law or statutory standards of negligence would seem to indicate 
their willingness to consider a plan such as that proposed herein. The pro-
posed plan should appear even more attractive to insurers than Nation-
wide's family compensation endorsement, since the injured passenger would 
have no option to seek damages through trial before a jury. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Present approaches to the driver-guest problem have failed to meet the 
public's need for fair and expeditious settlement of accident claims. Inherent 
difficulties in defining a driver's duty, coupled with the evils of litigation 
against insurance companies, can be resolved by removing the issue of negli-
gence entirely. All parties injured while passengers in an automobile would 
receive reasonable compensation, as opposed to the smaller number at 
present who are willing to navigate the rocky stream of ingratitude, collu-
sion, substantial expense and delay, with the ultimate award being distorted 
by unbridled sympathy of the jury. 
The proposal herein presented has many apparent advantages. By reduc-
ing the insurer's expenses for litigation and excessive awards, it is possible 
that compensation for all injured passengers would not entail the burden of 
higher rates for the public. This possibility, added to the prospect of greater 
fairness with less delay, argues strongly for adoption of the proposal. 
Harvey R. Friedman 
toward solving the problem of the uncompensated auto accident victim. Mr. Griffith's 
thoughts apparently have been borne out, as Nationwide's Family Compensation Endorse• 
ment, created as an experiment in 1957, is today a regular feature of their automobile 
policies. Ibid. 
